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Summary
In this article I look at attempts which have been, and are being, made to 
synthesise certain aspects of the English law of obligations or even to 
codify them. I point out that while some of these attempts have been 
successful, a number of others have created serious problems of their 
own. The conclusion is that before one tries to encapsulate the rules of 
English (or even European) law into ever more abstract propositions, 
these difficulties should be borne in mind and a degree of scepticism 
employed.
Introduction 
This paper concerns a vital theme in judge-made and other law: the 
creation of order from legal chaos. I have discussed the matter in one 
particular context – the law of obligations. My theme is that, while many 
efforts at synthesis have been brilliantly successful, others – perhaps 
more than might appear at first sight – have not. It may be that 
generalisation simply creates unclarity. The supposed underlying 
principle may be too widely or too narrowly stated. Or there may simply 
be no coherent principle to find in the first place. 
Starting off a discussion of this sort is hardly difficult. In any legal system 
worth the name, legal principles have always developed inductively, and 
by a process of increasing abstraction. If Result X applies in Cases A and 
B, why – lawyers and their clients have always asked – should it not also 
obtain in case C, where the relevant facts are (more or less) similar? 
General propositions, after all, are always neater, more convincing and 
easier to deal with than a congeries of random rules created haphazard 
by experience and the accidents of litigation. In addition, of course, they 
are easier to defend from the point of view of abstract justice. Like cases, 
after all, ought (all other things equal) to be decided alike: and the more 
abstract the proposition, the easier it is to defend from critics. No 
wonder, therefore, that jurists, or at least the more thoughtful ones, have 
always preferred cosmos to chaos and set themselves to thinking out and 
assembling general rules from disparate and at times unpromising single 
instances. Historical examples abound. The praetor peregrinus, who 
developed a ius naturale of contract from the specific forms reserved for 
Roman citizens, is a clear classical example. More recently there were 
Portalis and his collaborators who, faced with the mess of Roman sources 
and droit coûtumier that passed for law in eighteenth-century France 1, 
formed the touching idea that all this could be distilled into a collection 
of elegant if abstract principles of contract, delict and so on, so as to 
allow the notional citizen, armed merely with his slim Code Civil, to know 
precisely where he stood 2. And, of course, at the other end of the scale 
stand the Pandectists and others whose scholarship created the massive 
intellectual abstractions that go to make up the Obligations section of the 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch. 
Exactly the same thing goes for the common law. Think of the great cases 
which gathered together large numbers of previous authorities, 
processed them and effectively prevented us having to think about them 
again: cases, in other words, that came to provide the clear starting-point 
of any discussion. All involve, to a greater or lesser degree, a process of 
synthesis and rationalisation. Slade’s case (1602) 4 Co Rep 91a is an 
obvious early instance, producing something like a recognisable law of 
contract out of the dry bones of assumpsit. Again, take the economic 
torts. Filching other peoples’ servants or workmen (e.g., Hart v Aldridge 
(1774) 1 Cowp 54; Blake v Lanyon (1795) 6 T.R. 221) and one or two 
other cases of interfering in someone else’s business (for example, by 
shooting his customers, as in Tarleton v McGawley (1793) 1 Peake 270) 
had always been recognised as wrongful, but simply as isolated instances 
of delictual liability. In 1851 Lumley v Gye (1853) 2 E. & B. 216 took 
these materials and others like them, and used them as the foundation 
for an entirely abstract tort: knowingly inducing any breach of contract 
without good reason became a wrong in itself. Some time later, the year 
1868 saw with Rylands v Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330 the synthesis of 
a curiously mixed bunch of strict liability rules into something like a 
workable principle of social risk (albeit one which still at times defies 
close analysis and was arguably inappropriate even at the time). During 
the First World War, a slightly skewed collection of House of Lords cases 
starting with Horlock v Beal [1916] A.C. 486 hammered out a modern 
doctrine of frustration from a long series of rather disparate decisions 
from the previous century (we will have more to say about this below). 
The list goes on: Bell v Lever Bros [1932] A.C. 161 and Solle v Butcher 
1 As Voltaire succinctly put it, “Un homme qui voyage dans ce pays change de lois 
presque autant de fois qu’il change de chevaux de poste” – Dictionnaire Philosophique, 
V Coutumes.
2 Cf Schwartz 1956, Chs. 2, 4; Halpérin 1992, Ch.9.
[1950] 1 K.B. 671 on how error affects contractual liability; Donoghue v 
Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562 on general negligence liability; Hedley 
Byrne& Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] A.C. 465 on careless 
advice; Hong Kong FirShipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd 
[1962] 2 Q.B. 26 on material breach of contract; Lipkin Gorman v 
Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 A.C. 548 on a wide-ranging defence of change of 
position in restitution; and so on. 
Nor can we forget the synthesising power of statute. Compare the tangle 
of rules on causation, “last clear chance” and so on with the simple-
sounding comparative fault regime of the Law Reform (Contributory 
Negligence) Act 1945: or the rules on invitees and licensees and the 
varying duties owed to each with the concept of the common duty in the 
Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. Similarly, the Unfair Contract Terms 1977 
was able to set the doubts of the common law 3 at rest by introducing, 
where consumer protection needed it, the general idea of  “inequality of 
bargaining power”.
Difficulties 
In all these cases the process has been one of simplification; of 
generalisation; and, to some degree, of abstraction.  And, very often, the 
attempt at improvement has been spectacularly successful. No sane 
restitution lawyer wants to restore the anomaly and uncertainty 
bedevilling the defence of change of position before Lipkin Gorman; and 
you would have to be a very keen pettifogger indeed to hanker after the 
last opportunity doctrine in contributory negligence, or the impenetrable 
legal thicket that predated the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957.
Yet, on further thought, doubts still nag. We memorialise our successes 
and forget our failures; and actually the record of such generalisation is 
much patchier than it looks. For every success story which makes its way 
into the law teacher’s canon, there is a surprising number of other 
attempts at synthesis that have failed outright, or have gone off at half-
cock, or have simply been quietly abandoned, leaving little more than 
troubled lawyers and a few litigants impoverished in direct proportion to 
their advocates’ gain. Now, these unsuccessful attempts to bring order to 
chaos can, if anything, be more interesting than the successful ones. 
Apart from anything else, they may help us to see where attempts to 
rationalise the law are likely to succeed.
Over-generalisation and under-specificity
I have taken four examples to support my argument. The first, since 
transmuted into a historical footnote (in England, at least), is Lloyds 
3 Largely introduced by Lord Denning: e.g. Gillespie Bros & Co Ltd v Roy Bowles 
Transport Ltd [1973] Q.B. 400, 416; Re Brocklehurst, dec’d [1978] Ch 14, 31.
Bank v Bundy [1975] Q.B. 326. In case anyone needs reminding what 
happened, a ne’er-do-well customer of the bank had run out of credit to 
prop up his ailing business. The bank leant heavily on his elderly father, 
and in due course the latter without further advice mortgaged his farm to 
cover his son’s further outgoings. Things went from bad to worse, the 
bank sought to cash in on its security, and the father sought relief. Lord 
Denning M.R., like the rest of the court, had no difficulty in saying that 
orthodox undue influence doctrine prevented the bank from holding the 
mortgage, and he was clearly right. But, having done so, he went on to 
deprecate the idea of maintaining the existing learning on duress, undue 
influence, unconscionable bargains and similar doctrines as separate 
ideas. On the contrary: “I think”, he said, “the time has come when we 
should seek to find a principle to unite them.” And he then went on to 
suggest that
“through  all  these  instances  there  runs  a  single  thread. 
They rest on ‘inequality of bargaining power’. By virtue of 
it,  the  English  law  gives  relief  to  anyone  who,  without 
independent advice, enters into a contract on terms which 
are very unfair  or  transfers  property  for  a  consideration 
which is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining power is 
grievously impaired by reason of his own needs or desires, 
or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue 
influences or pressures brought to bear on him by or for 
the benefit of the other.” (see p.337).
The rationalisation has an attractive ring to it. One can almost see the 
potential provision in a would-be English Civil Code on the European 
model: “Contracts are binding on the parties, save in the case of manifest 
unfairness, or of unconscionable advantage taken of one party’s 
weakness, etc...” 4, and so on. No doubt this is why the idea received a 
considerable welcome from the academics 5, besides being echoed in a 
series of later cases dealing with personal injury settlements 6, and 
indeed extended to cover restraint of trade as well 7. Nevertheless, the 
whole thing turned out to be a nine-years’ wonder. In 1984 it fell to Lord 
Scarman to administer the coup de grâce in National WestminsterBank 
plc v Morgan [1985] A.C. 696. There was no reason to abandon the 
4 Cf. McGregor 1993. In this proposed English Contract Code (prepared for the Law 
Commission and published by Sweet & Maxwell in 1993), he provided in § 564: 
“Improper economic advantage is taken of a contracting party when a person knows 
that he is under such pressure of circumstances to enter into the contract and takes 
unfair advantage of that pressure to obtain manifestly unfair terms.”
5 See, e.g. Cheshire & Fifoot, 1972, pp.282-283; Carr 1975; Waddams 1976; Trebilcock 
1976. To be fair, some commentators were less carried away: e.g. Sealy 1975.
6 Arrale v Costain [1976] 1 Lloyds Rep 98; see too Horry v Tate & Lyle Refineries Ltd 
[1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 416. Both were agreed by plaintiffs as a result of advice provided 
obligingly by the defendant’s liability insurers. 
7 A. Schroeder v Macauley [1974] 1 W.L.R. 1308; Clifford Davis Management v WEA 
Records Ltd [1975] 1 All E.R. 237
separate treatment of undue influence: any general principle of 
inequality of bargaining power was otiose; the matter called for the 
precision of legislation rather than the broad brush of legal decision (see 
pp.707-708).
What went wrong? I suggest two things: over-generalisation, and under-
specificity. As to the first, it is easy to forget that contracts, and the 
position in which contractors might find themselves, vary far more than 
legal theorists and academic commentators care to admit8. More 
importantly, so do the moral and other values lying behind particular 
exceptions to freedom of contract. A very real difficulty with Bundy was 
that it tried to conflate rules with widely differing purposes. The rules of 
economic duress are aimed at upholding commercial morality; 
unconscionability and coercion à la Williams v Bayley (1866) L.R. 1 H.L. 
200 at preventing undue exploitation of human frailty; and undue 
influence at suppressing the misuse of opportunities to control others’ 
actions. These aims may no doubt have some very vague principle in 
common: but they remain substantially different. With such varied 
material, it is hardly surprising that a uniform solution should be hard to 
make stick.
The other problem, under-specificity, is not simply another word for 
uncertainty. It is rather that whereas undue influence, duress, and so on 
have relatively precise meanings, inequality of bargaining power (or 
unconscionability) on its own is a concept which, like a number of others 
used by lawyers, does not 9. If a litigant argues that unfair advantage has 
been taken of her inexperience in financial matters, it is clear what she is 
alleging. True, there is obviously no “bright line” between what amounts 
to unfair advantage and what does not. Nevertheless, it is clear what 
enquiries the tribunal has to make. Alleging unconscionability or 
“inequality of bargaining power”, by contrast, merely invites further 
definition. Faced with such an allegation, in practice all one can do is to 
ask “What kind of unconscionability is being alleged?” – which, of course, 
takes one straight back to the individual concepts from which the original 
generalisation was derived.
Bundy’s case is a very good example of the difficulties of over-
generalisation and insufficient specificity. There are, of course, others. 
Anns v Merton L.B.C. [1978] A.C. 728, extending Donoghue v Stevenson 
[1932] A.C. 562 to cover negligent licensing of building work, was one. 
The case involved a claimant who deserved some sympathy. She was a 
8 As Weir 1976 at p.34 pungently put it: “Different transactions call for different rules, 
even if they are all contracts … it is not a merit of the common law to fail to distinguish 
what a child can tell apart, who knows better than to offer ‘rent’ to the bus-conductor or 
a ‘premium’ to his barber”. 
9 As American lawyers have found when trying to apply a similar provision, § 2-302 of 
the U.C.C. Another example is the “good faith” provision in § 242 of the German Civil 
Code: for all its apparent simplicity, German lawyers have had to go to astonishing 
lengths to unravel its meaning, and to delineate those practices which count as lack of 
good faith.
consumer (or at least acting in a private capacity). She was left with a 
dangerous house and the ruinous expense of making it habitable. So the 
decision was understandable. But the principle invoked in that case was 
entirely inappropriate where consumer protection and safety 
considerations of this sort were absent: which was largely why a dozen or 
so years later the principle had to be discountenanced by the House of 
Lords in Murphy v Brentwood D.C. [1991] 1 A.C. 398 10. As for under-
specificity, an interesting example comes in the idea, often proposed but 
not yet acted on in English law, that there should be an obligation of 
“good faith” in contract (see, e.g., Beatson 1995, Chs. 1, 9; Collins 1994). 
In abstracto, such an idea seems admirable. But, once again, it is 
worryingly indeterminate. Asked to define it, one is thrown back on more 
specific instances, such as the idea that certain contractual rights should 
have to be exercised reasonably; that one should not be allowed to take 
advantage of a contract when one has knowingly concealed relevant 
information from the other party; and so on.
Mistaken identification of a general principle
My second example concerns a rather more straightforward difficulty 
inherent in attempts to reduce chaos to order. Before assuming that a 
series of disparate authorities can be reduced to a simple expression, it is 
as well to think whether the reasons behind those authorities actually 
support a generalisation of this sort. The instance I have chosen to 
illustrate this may surprise some people. It is Hedley Byrne [1964] A.C. 
465, and the subsequent cases based on it that have extended the tort of 
negligence to cover professional liability. At first sight this seems an 
unpromising subject for attack. Who could argue with the idea that there 
ought to be a potential liability for negligent misstatement, even where 
the claimant cannot show a contract or alternatively some relationship 
cognisable in equity – particularly in view of the very constricted nature 
of the English law of contract? Who indeed  … but this misses the point. 
The difficulty, as I see it, does not lie in the bald proposition that such a 
liability should exist. Where a person gives advice to another on the basis 
that that other can rely on it and hold the giver responsible if it is 
negligent, clearly the law must provide a remedy. Thus I have no quarrel 
with the decision itself. The problem lies rather in the failure of courts to 
articulate precisely why the liability should exist. Since Hedley Byrne, we 
have a veritable jungle of cases concerning the duty of care as it affects 
the professional liability of accountants, solicitors and others. Yet even 
after all that, including nearly half-a-dozen cases in the House of Lords 11, 
advising as to whether a duty of care is owed has become at times well-
10 Interestingly enough, some Australian courts have been prepared to develop the 
common law in a more focused manner, and to accept Anns’ case while limiting it 
effectively to private buyers of dwelling-houses. A most instructive example is Fangrove 
Pty Ltd v Tod Group Pty Ltd [1999] 2 Qd.R. 236.
11 Smith v Eric S. Bush [1990] 1 A.C. 831; Caparo Industries plc v Dickman & Ors 
[1990] 2 A.C. 605; Marc Rich & Co AG v Bishop Rock Marine [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1071; 
Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 A.C. 145; White v Jones [1995] 2 A.C. 207.
nigh impossible. Although judicial reasoning almost invariably starts with 
Hedley Byrne, the guidance offered by that case in determining the duty 
of care question.  
The difficulty, of course, is this. From a reading of Hedley Byrne itself, 
and its sequels such as Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 605, White v 
Jones [1995] 2 A.C. 207 and Smith v Eric S. Bush [1990] 1 A.C. 831, what 
comes across clearly is that the courts regard the Hedley Byrne principle 
as just an extension of ordinary tort liability, albeit one calling for careful 
treatment. Talk of “voluntary assumption of responsibility”, “special 
relationships” or the purposes for which advice is given sounds well in 
abstracto. Nevertheless, what we have in effect is liability based on a 
high degree of foreseeability, subject to a let-out in the case of off-the-
cuff remarks, explicitly unwarranted advice, and situations likely to 
spawn practical problems such as open-ended or over-expansive liability. 
Witness, in particular, the repeated citation of Denning L.J.’s judgment in 
Candler v Crane Christmas [1951] 2 K.B. 164, which had put liability on 
precisely this basis, and the  repeated emphasis on the need for some 
kind of safety-catch to be fitted to notional floodgates. But all this, it is 
submitted, is simply misconceived. It forgets that in the Hedley Byrne 
context, tort is doing not one job but two, and different rules ought to 
apply to each. One function parallels the rest of the ordinary law of 
“social responsibility” negligence. Subject to practical or other limits, we 
must pay for the damage we culpably do, and it should make no 
difference that the medium is words not actions, or (at least to some 
extent) that the only damage is to someone else’s bank balance rather 
than to their person or tangible property. Minister of Housing v Sharp 
[1970] 2 Q.B. 223, the case where a Land Registry blunder annihilated 
the Ministry’s cast-iron claim against a householder, is a perfect example. 
Here, by all means base liability on (modified) foreseeability of the 
claimant, his loss, etc., with one eye on preventing tort law from getting 
out of hand. The issue is really the same as in Donoghue v Stevenson, 
even though it may need more sensitive handling. But remember that in 
practice this is a rather rare scenario. Read any book on professional 
negligence, and you will realise that most Hedley Byrne claims are not 
“social responsibility” actions at all, but rather complaints about quality 
of service 12. They concern not dangerous services but bad ones; to take 
the analogy of the distribution of goods, they parallel not so much 
Donoghue v Stevenson but ss.13-14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. The 
only reason they fall within the law of tort is that often services are in 
substance rendered to someone who for whatever reason (privity, 
consideration, etc) does not have a contract with the person providing 
them, and that some means has to be found to allow that person to take 
the benefit of a guarantee of proper execution – if that is the intention of 
the provider. Now, in the case of sale of goods it has always been 
acceptable for a supplier to say “Yes, we admit the goods were defective. 
12 Indeed, this is true of every one of the House of Lords cases referred to in the 
previous note.
We also admit that it was our fault, and that we should have known you 
would suffer loss if you relied on them. But you still shouldn’t be able to 
sue us, because we didn’t supply them to you.” That is the point of 
decisions like Simaan v Pilkington (No 2) [1988] Q.B. 758, the case of the 
discoloured glass that – as a building company found to its cost – would 
not quite do for the Sheikh’s new palace in Abu Dhabi. In exactly the 
same way, I would suggest, the practice (if not the theory) of Hedley 
Byrne liability is moving in a similar direction. The question is not really 
foreseeability in any guise, but “to whom were the services rendered?”13 
Take Caparo v Dickman [1990] 2 A.C. 605 and ask an obvious question. 
Why was Swraj Paul not allowed to dip into Price Waterhouse’s pocket to 
make good his losses when he found, on taking over Fidelity plc, that he 
had bought a pup? It wasn’t that he was unforeseeable as a plaintiff (the 
defendants knew perfectly well about the possibility of a bid); nor was 
there an insuperable problem of open-ended liability (the Court of Appeal 
had dealt with that by confining the right to sue to existing shareholders 
– see [1989] Q.B. 653). The House of Lords decided the issue by 
reference to the intentions and purposes of auditors’ reports: reasoning 
that may sound convincing, but, if one may say so, fails really to answer 
the question. Whose intention (or purpose) mattered? The defendants’? 
The claimants’? Parliament’s? What sort of intention are we talking 
about? Actual? Implied? Imputed? And so on. But strip away the 
verbiage, and there is a straightforward answer to the problem. The 
auditors had provided a service, but they had provided it to Fidelity and 
not to Caparo. Save that the case concerned services and not goods, 
Caparo were in exactly the same position as the Simaan Engineering Co 
had been in Simaan v Pilkington [1988] Q.B. 758. They had relied on 
something supplied to a third party; they had been disappointed; and 
they failed for (it is suggested) the same reason. 
For another example, take the position of a sub-agent. Normally he will 
not be under any duty as regards quality of service vis-à-vis the ultimate 
principal. He works for, and answers to, the person appointing him alone 
(see, e.g., Pangood Ltd v Barclay Brown & Co Ltd [1999] P.N.L.R. 678, 
holding that an insurance sub-broker owes no duty of care to the ultimate 
client). Even though he may know that the ultimate principal stands to 
benefit from his efforts, the latter cannot sue because they were not 
provided to him. But exceptionally the case may be different. Suppose a 
Lloyds agent is employed to look after the account of a particular Name, 
but technically he acts as a sub-agent. Here, whatever the legal form, he 
is in substance acting directly for the Name: from which it is hardly 
surprising that the House of Lords has held in Henderson v Merrett 
Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 A.C. 145 that he owes a direct duty of care.
13 In rare cases this is made clear. See, for example, Kapfunde v Abbey Life [1999] 
Lloyd’s Rep. Med. 48, where a company doctor examining a prospective employee for 
signs of illness was held to owe no duty to the employee. The main reason given was 
that the latter was not the doctor’s patient, i.e., not the person to whom the services 
were being rendered. 
Failure to understand the underlying principle
The next reason for failure which I would like to highlight is less 
forgivable. It is difficult not to believe that at times our judges, in trying 
to craft general principles from of a confusing congeries of conflicting 
case-law, have simply failed adequately to understand it or the principles 
behind it. This is a hard charge, but I think it can be made to stick. An 
instance, it is submitted, is the contractual doctrine of frustration. 
It is a common misconception that frustration as we know it originated 
with Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 3 B. & S. 826, the case of the impresario 
and the burnt-down theatre, and the abandonment from then on of the 
old “hell and high water” doctrine of Paradine v Jane (1647) Aleyn 26. 
The reality, if one looks at it closely, is less tidy. There were actually quite 
a number of scattered nineteenth-century and older authorities, of which 
Taylor v Caldwell was just one, allowing a contractor to escape liability 
on the basis of supervening impossibility14. There were in addition other 
cases which said, understandably, that where one party failed to perform 
his side of a contract through no fault of his own, the other party was 
himself excused 15. The real origin of frustration as a separate doctrine 
lay in a series of decisions in the First World War which collected these 
older cases about excuses for non-performance, “rationalised” them and 
transmuted them into the modern idea that a frustrating event displaced 
the contract itself. For example, a series of venerable decisions said that 
an employee had no claim on his employer if he was prevented by no 
fault of his own from doing his job for an appreciable time and was 
sacked as a result 16. There was no difficulty about this, since it reflected 
ordinary contract doctrine: if unable, albeit blamelessly, to provide his 
side of the bargain, the employee could not make the employer perform 
his 17. There was little, if any, suggestion that the dissolution of the whole 
contract was in issue 18. Horlock v Beal [1916] A.C. 486, a 1916 case in 
the House of Lords, raised exactly this point – could sailors claim wages 
for time spent languishing in German internment camps after their ships 
had been seized, or had their employers effectively ended their right to 
be paid by discharging them? The House duly held they had no claim 
from the moment of internment: what is interesting, however, is Lord 
14 E.g. Brewster v Kitchell (1697) 1 Salk 198; Avery v Bowden (1855) 5 E. & B. 714; 
Baily v de Crespigny (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 180.
15 E.g. Tarrabolchia v Hickie (1856) 1 H. & N. 183 and Jackson v Union Marine (1874) 
L.R. 10  C.P. 125 (both charterparty cases); Melville v de Wolf (1855) 4 E. & B. 844 
(mariner’s wages not payable during time when mariner prevented from serving). 
16 E.g. Melville v de Wolf (1855) 4 E. & B. 844, above.
17 E.g. Poussard v Spiers (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 410. 
18 Save possibly in the case of trading with the enemy: e.g. Esposito v Bowden (1857) 7 
E. & B. 763. But this was always a special case: witness Ertel Bieber v Rio Tinto [1918] 
A.C. 260, holding that even express stipulation could not override the dissolutive effect. 
Stoljar argues (History of Contract at Common Law (Canberra 1974)) that the 
“dissolution” theory appeared in Geipel v Smith (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 404, where a 
shipowner prevented from loading for six months did not have to load thereafter: but 
this case seems better explained on the basis of a reasonable interpretation of the 
obligation undertaken.
Loreburn’s opinion in this case. He read the older cases as embodying 
the proposition that prolonged inability of one or other side to perform 
had the effect of ending, not simply the other side's duty to accept 
performance, but the contract as a whole; and this, he said, was the 
reason for the sailors’ inability to sue (see p.***). Now, this was a major 
change: it quietly shifted frustration from “excuses for non-performance” 
where it belonged, to “discharge of contracts” where it did not. In 
Horlock v Beal the change actually made no difference: even if the 
contract had not been terminated, the seamen had no claim under it 
anyway. But in later decisions it mattered. Take, for example, Tamplin v 
James [1916] 2 A.C. 397. A tanker was requisitioned as a troopship for a 
substantial chunk of a five-year charter. Since compensation from the 
Crown was generous in those days, and went to whoever had the use of 
the ship at the time, the charterers naturally claimed that they had the 
right to the money. On the basis of Horlock v Beal, it was accepted by the 
House of Lords that the charterers’ right depended on whether there had 
been a frustrating event: if there had not they would win, but if there 
had, then the contract would be at an end and the right to the ship would 
have reverted to the owner. But on the basis of the old impossibility cases 
this seems very odd. If I am prepared to pay you for the right to use a 
ship despite the fact that you cannot provide it because the Government 
has taken it, why should I not be allowed to do so? Since the Tamplin 
case, the theory of termination by frustration has continued to show its 
baneful influence: in the idea that a contract can be discharged despite 
the belief that both parties think it continues in force 19: in the idea that 
the doctrine of impossibility must be confined narrowly because if it does 
apply the drastic consequence follows that the whole contract collapses; 
and in the problems where one party to a contract has attempted to use 
his own wrongdoing to argue that the contract cannot be frustrated 
because the alleged event is self-induced 20.
Frustration is not, of course, the only instance of woolly thinking leading 
to inappropriate generalisation. The doctrine of deviation in carriage of 
goods by sea is another obvious one. The straightforward and absolutely 
comprehensible cases holding that a bailee became an insurer if he did 
as he should not with the goods 21 was shoehorned into the law of 
termination of contracts for breach of condition 22, with predictably 
19 Thus neutralising an arbitration agreement, for example: Hirji Mulji v Chong Yue SS 
Co [1926] A.C. 497. This impeccably logical piece of nonsense eventually had to be put 
right by statute: Arbitration Act 1996, s.7.
20 In particular, Hare v Murphy Bros Ltd [1984] ICR 603 and F. C. Shepherd Ltd v 
Jerrom [1987] Q.B. 301, where workers imprisoned for misconduct tried to argue – with 
logic but no merit – that their contracts of employment must have continued in force to 
allow them to sue for unfair dismissal, since any alleged frustration had been self-
induced (by themselves).
21 For example, Davis v Garrett (1830) 6 Bing. 716. The principle can be traced back at 
least to dicta in Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 Ld. Ray. 909, 913.
22 Especially Joseph Thorley v Orchis Shipping Co Ltd [1907] 1 K.B. 660 and Hain SS 
Co v Tate & Lyle (1936) 41 Com.Cas. 350.
shambolic results 23. In another instance, the rule that anyone could sue 
for conversion of goods if he had an immediate right to possess them at 
common law was extended without thinking to mere equitable owners, 
again with massive destabilising potential 24; and there are others.
Abstraction for abstraction’s sake
The fourth problem as often as not goes entirely unnoticed. At times, the 
desire to create a logical whole has, as it were, taken over and as a result 
simply glided over important and valuable doctrinal distinctions: 
abstraction has been pursued for abstraction's sake. A nice example of 
this comes from hornbook contract law, and in particular the rule that 
one could not enforce a contract if one was not a party or (until 1999) 
had not given consideration. It never seemed to worry students or others 
that a number of the stock authorities here did not involve attempts to 
enforce a contract at all, but rather either purported waiver of an 
existing contractual right (for example, release of a debt and the rule in 
Foakes v Beer (1884) 9 App. Cas. 605), or alternatively an attempt to 
take advantage of an exception clause in a contract (the problem in 
Scruttons Ltd v Midland Silicones Ltd [1962] A.C. 446). In both these 
situations, it had simply been assumed without discussion that the 
requirements for creating binding contractual rights should equally apply 
to their cancellation or modification, and to the question whether they 
could be relied on defensively when incorporated in an exception clause. 
But however satisfying the abstract proposition (contract requires 
consideration: no-one can rely on a contract if he has not given 
consideration) a moment’s thought shows that the point is by no means 
obvious. The arguments for demanding formalities or other prerequisites 
to create contractual relations where none existed before are strong. 
Contractual obligation, especially gratuitous contractual obligation, 
should not be lightly inferred. But the case is far weaker where what is 
claimed is a mere variation of a contract, or reduction of a sum already 
owing (as other systems of law accept). The same goes for third-party 
reliance on exception clauses: at least where the clause is known to and 
relied on by the beneficiary, there is a strong argument for the 
application of volenti non fit injuria, or some similar doctrine 25, whatever 
the status of the beneficiary as regards the contract as a whole. 
Conclusion 
23 For example, the odd idea that a deviating shipowner who delivered the cargo safe 
and sound could not claim the contract freight, the contract having disappeared – Hain 
SS Co v Tate & Lyle (1936) 41 Com.Cas. 350, 368-369 (Lord Wright) – or that terms 
protecting him from liability could not apply even after the ship had arrived at its 
destination (Joseph Thorley v Orchis Shipping Co Ltd [1907] 1 K.B. 660).
24 The history of this heresy is nicely exposed in MCC Realisations Ltd v Lehman Bros 
[1998] 4 All E.R. 675.
25 As Lord Denning, to his credit, pointed out when dissenting in Midland Silicones: 
[1962] A.C. 446, 488 et seq.
What lessons can be drawn from all this? In a way, the answer is obvious. 
Despite its attraction to law students and academics alike, legal 
generalisation should be approached with some caution. Like marriage, it 
is not something to be undertaken “lightly, wantonly or inadvisedly”. 
Before attempting to draw together a collection of single instances and 
create some all-encompassing rule out of them, it is as well to consider 
(a) whether one has actually understood the materials concerned; (b) 
whether there is sufficient commonality between them, so as to avoid the 
risk of obliterating important distinctions; (c) whether the existing rules 
in fact serve a common purpose; and (d) whether one is not simply 
substituting some amorphous and uninformative principle for structured 
and reasoned argument. 
There is, however, a further point. The idea of codifying and thereby 
simplifying the principles of private law we live under has always been an 
active one, and is becoming increasingly so with the growing influence of 
the European Union. The ongoing proposal for a European Contract Code 
(European Commission 2001) is just one example. Another, slightly less 
far-reaching and more on the line of the American Restatement, is the 
academic project for a statement of General Principles of European 
Contract Law. But even the great codes of France and Germany, with all 
their carefully thought out distillations of principle, have by no means 
produced a perfect solution: there are plenty of examples of provisions 
which are either so general as to tell us very little, or have had to be 
artificially cut down to avoid unfortunate results. There may equally well 
be dangers lurking in the current proposals. In the European Contract 
Law proposals, for example, the wide-ranging provision for unfair 
contract terms (§ 4.110) is based on the wording of the European 
Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts but oddly is not even 
limited to consumer contracts. There is room for a fair number of 
difficulties here of the type described above. Again, there is an awkward 
proposal (to be found in § 9.303(4)) which seems to perpetuate the idea 
that certain frustrating events put an end to the whole contract willy-
nilly; this will certainly raise some scepticism in anyone who has seen the 
mess this idea has already caused in English law. 
In short, anyone who is thinking of taking parts of English law down the 
same road should stop to think about such matters, and consider whether 
the result may not be a great deal of well-meaning effort expended for 
surprisingly little return.
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